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the respondents.

An answer was duly entered by the Salt Lake County

Attorney's Office for the appellants in their official capacity and
thereafter an entry of appearance was filed by Robert D. Moore, as
attorney for the appellants personally.

An application was duly made

to have the matter certified as a class action.

A motion to intervene

on behalf of Charlene Polly Cook was subsequently filed and granted.
The respondents 1 motion to certify the case as a class action was
subsequently withdrawn but thereafter reinstated.

The court on the 21st

day of May, 1975, denied certification of the matter as a class action
and thereafter the case was submitted on each party's motion for summary
judgment.

The trial court entered a memorandum decision on the 3rd day

of June, 1975, and an extraordinary writ was thereafter entered prohibitii
the appellants from imposing jail sentences or imprisonment on the respondents in the event the respondents were convicted of the charges
pending against them.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts before the trial court consisted of the
allegations of the respondents 1 complaint and admitted by appellants
that respondents, Larry J. Shelmidine and John R. Reeves, were charged
with the crime of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The case against Shelmidine was set for trial before Justice of the
Peace Charles A. Jones on January 16, 1975, at 2:30 p.m. and the trial
of Reeves before Lynn D. Bernard on March 25, 1975.

Both of the

respondents plead not guilty and are residents of Salt Lake County.
The appellants are justices of the peace exercising precinct jurisdiction
in Salt Lake County.

At the time of the hearing on motion for summary

judgment, it was
stipulated that none of the appellants was a member of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

the Bar of the State of Utah.

On the basis of the facts presented

and the contentions of the respondents that appellants could not
exercise jurisdiction over respondents, the trial court rendered a
memorandum decision in which it found:
Justice of the peace courts in Utah, manned
by non-lawyer judges, are courts of convenience,
particularly in isolated rural areas typical of
most of this state in which there are few, and
sometimes no attorneys.

Modern transportation and communication have
considerably alleviated much of the problem earlier
encountered in effectuating a viable means of
administering effective and speedy justice on the
misdemeanor level. Nevertheless, of the 29 counties
in Utah there are still eight counties with two or
less resident attorneys and five counties with no
resident attorney, for lawyers, whose livelihood
is dependent upon the services they are able to
render to people, have tended to settle in the
more populous regions of the state, requiring
the inhabitants in many areas to travel some
considerable distance to obtain legal counsel.
The impact of this on the administration of
misdemeanor offenses -- the very type of offense
with which a limited-jurisdiction, lay justice of
the peace most frequently deals -- is immediately
apparent: One-third of the counties of the state
do not have enough resident lawyers to staff the
justice courts and still have a prosecutor and
defense counsel.

If one is entitled, under the growing concepts
of Due Process and fair trial, to legal counsel
in a misdemeanor case where there is a possibility
of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
92 S^Ct. 2006, 32 U E d . 2d 530 (1972), see also
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792,
9 L.Ed. 2d 799 (1953), the Due Process, the right
to a fair trial and the right to counsel likewise
mandate that under such circumstances only a
lawyer-judge, qualified by training, background,
and experience to comprehend and utilize counsel's
legal arguments, can impose a sentence of imprisonment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Th1s Court therefore finds and holds that the
practice under Utah law which allows non-lawyer
or lay justices of the peace to impose a jail
sentence or right to a fair trial 1n violation
of the mandate of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
. . . (T)he defendants are prohibited as lay judges
from imposing imprisonment and jail sentence upon a
conviction of the offenses over which they otherwise
have jurisdiction.
Respondents have asserted by way of statement of respondents
points on cross appeal under Rule 74 and 75d, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure that the trial court erred in not directing that the writ
of prohibition prevent defendants from hearing any criminal trials
involving charges which may result in jail sentence.
POINT I
THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM IN THE STATE OF UTAH IS
ESTABLISHED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS
AND IS THEREFORE PRESUMPTIVELY CORRECT AND SHOULD NOT BE
RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPELLING
FEDERAL DEMAND.
The judicial power in the State of Utah is vested in the Senate
sitting as a court of impeachment, the Supreme Court, District Courts
and Justices of the Peace as well as other inferior courts established
by law.

Article VIII Section 1 Constitution of Utah.

Justice of the

peace courts have been part of the judicial system of Utah from
territorial days.

In the Matter of Wiseman, 1 Utah 39.

The tradition

of justice courts carried over into statehood with express recognition
in the Constitution in Article VIII Section 8 which provides:
The Legislature shall determine the number of
justices of the peace to be elected, and shall fix
by law their powers, duties and compensation. The
jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be as
now provided by law, but the Legislature may restrict
the same.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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And Article VIII Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Utah
provides for appeals from final judgments of the justice of the peace
in civil and criminal cases to the district courts on both questions
of law and fact.

The Legislature of the State of Utah has made provisions

for the establishment of various types of justices courts.

§ 10-6-74

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for the appointment of city or town _•
justices and Title 78 Chapter 5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides for
the jurisdiction and qualification of justices courts.

§ 17*18*5 Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, provides that the Board of County

Commissioners

shall divide the county into precincts for the purpose of electing justic<
of the peace and constables.

The justice of the peace must reside and

hold court in the precinct, city or town for which he was elected or
appointed.

§ 78-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

City and town justices

of the peace have exclusive original jurisdiction of cases arising by
reason of a violation of any city or town ordinance.

Criminal

jurisdicti(

of justices courts is provided in i 78-5-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and,
in effect, provides for misdemeanor jurisdiction of fines up to $299 or
imprisonment not to exceed six months or both.

§ 78-3-5 Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, gives the district court jurisdiction to entertain
appeals in criminal and civil cases from final judgments of the district
court in accordance with the constitutional
mentioned.

provisions

heretofore

Consequently, the Utah Constitution and Statutes provide a

comprehensive system for the functioning and operation of justices

courts

Under these circumstances, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality attendant to the Utah justice of the peace system.

Tintic

Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 633 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ;
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Norville v, State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937 (1940);
Sord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967); United
States v. National Dairy Products Corp,,

372 U.S. 29 (1963).

In

this instance, a presumption of reasonableness accompanies the exercise
of the police power by the State.

Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake,

19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967).

The party assailing the legislative

classification as arbitrary has the burden of showing it to be so.
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Consequently, the party plaintiffs below have the burden of overcoming
the presumption of the validity of the Utah justice of the peace system.
In attacking the legality of having a lay justice of the peace hear a
case in which a jail sentence may be imposed, or as the trial court ruled
prohibiting a lay justice from imposing a jail sentence, the respondents
relied exclusively on the Federal Constitution.

Only if principles of

federal constitutional law overcome the presumption of validity can
respondents prevail in this appeal.
POINT II
THE UTAH PROCEDURE WHICH ALLOWS A LAY JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
TO PRESIDE AT A CASE INVOLVING A MATTER IN WHICH A JAIL
SENTENCE COULD BE IMPOSED, OR TO IMPOSE A JAIL SENTENCE,
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
Respondents contend that a denial of due process of law results
when a lay justice of the peace is allowed to preside in a case in which
a prison sentence could be imposed.

The trial court apparently concluded

that there was such a denial of due process of law if a prison sentence
was actually imposed.

It is submitted that neither conclusion is

required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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History
Lay justices of the peace have long been part of the English
common law tradition.

In Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. One,

The Judicial System, it is observed with reference to the establishment
of justices of the peace:
In fact, the duties of the justices have for a long
time past depended much more upon a mass of statute
law than upon their commission; and, for the miscellaneous governmental and judicial duties which
were thus devolved upon them, a professional lawyer
was not needed. The duties were done by the country
gentry; and the office of justice of the peace thus
afforded an excellent training for the knight of the
shire.
More recently, justices of the peace have been more representative of
all classes of the community in England.

Holdsworth, supra, page 292.

However, it is noted:
But the justices still retain their judicial powers,
and some small remnant of those administrative powers
which gave them, in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and
eighteenth centuries, entire control over the local
government of the country.
In Giles, The Criminal Law, Rev. Ed. 1961, page 101, it is observed:
Apart from these professional salaried magistrates,
the work of the magistrates 1 courts is done by the
lay justices advised by a clerk who is either a
solicitor or barrister.
It would seem that the use of lay magistrates and justices of the peace
in criminal and civil matters has a long history in English law.

Hardin,

A Social History of English Law, p. 71-73 (1966).
The American colonialists borrowed heavily from English legal
tradition.——

In Friedman, A History of American Law, 1973, it is

observed:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In a common-law system, judges make at least some
of the law, even if their theory denies this fact.
American statesmen were not naive; they knew that it
mattered what the judges believed and who they were.
How judges were to be chosen and how they were to act
was a political issue in the Revolutionary generation,
at a pitch of intensity rarely reached before or since.
8tate after state -- and the federal government -fought political battles on issues of selection and
control of the bench.
The bench was not homogeneous. Judges varied in
quality and qualification, in level and place, from
local justices of the peace to the Supreme Court Chief
Justice. English and colonial tradition had room for
lay judges, as well as for judges learned in law. Lay
judges flourished both at the top and the bottom of the
pyramid.

The lay judges were not necessarily politicians, though
this was ordinarily the case. But they were invariably
prominent local men. William E. Nelson has studied the
background and careers of the eleven men who served as
justices of the superior court of Massachusetts between
1760 and 1774, on the even, that is, of the Revolution.
Nine had never practiced law; six had never even studied
law. All, however, of these liy judges had 'either been
born into prominent families or become men of substance. 1
Stephen Sewall, chief justice in 1760, was the nephew
of a former chief justice; he had served thirteen years
as a tutor at Harvard College.
The base of the pyramid was even more dominated by
laymen. Lay justice did not necessarily mean popular or
unlettered justice at the trial-court level. The English
squires were laymen, but hardly men of the people. Lay
justice in America had something of the character of rule

§ 68-3-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, adopts the common law of England
as the law of the State of Utah except to the extent that it is
in conflict with constitutional or statutory law or inconsistent
with the natural and physical conditions of the state and this
applies to criminal procedure as well. State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268,
254 Pac. 142 (1927).
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by the squires. Nor was lay justice necessarily informal.
Laymen, after years on the bench, often soaked up the
lawyer's jargon and tone. After all, lawyers frequently
came to the bar after the briefest of clerkships and with
little more than a smattering of Blackstone. Lay judges,
then, did not absorb their law much differently than the
average trained lawyer.
It goes without need of citation that lay judges are prevalent today
throughout the United States and in many remote areas are absolutely
essential to a reasonable functioning of a judicial system.

Smith,

The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 Cal. L. Rev.
118 (1927).
As the trial court noted in the instant case, five counties of the State
of Utah have no resident attorney and eight counties of the twenty-nine
counties in Utah have two or less resident attorneys.

It may be con-

cluded that the historical use of lay judges was a recognition of
necessity.

To the extent that respondents contend that due process

requires a lawyer judge in certain instances, there appears to be no
historical justification for such a position.
Due Process in Misdemeanor Cases
The jurisdiction of justices of the peace in Utah is relatively
limited.

Imprisonment may be imposed but may not exceed six months.

A fine of up to $299 may also be imposed.
to the federal petty offense statute.

This standard is similar

18 U.S.C. 13.

In Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S. 154 (1968), the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury was applicable to the states under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

However, in Duncan,

by dicta, the court asserted that petty offenses did not require jury
trials.

The same position was taken in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.

66 (1970).

Most recently, in United States v. Goeltz, 513 F.2d 193
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(10th Cir. 1975), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that there
was no right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment in a criminal case
that merely involved a petty offense.

Consequently! the severity of the

penalty is to some degree a measure of the extent to which due process
requires a particular procedure.

Even today in the federal

system,

there is no mandatory requirement that United States magistrates be
members of the local bar.

28 U.S.C. § 631(b).

It is submitted that if the right to a jury trial is not so
fundamental as to be encompassed within due process in a petty offense
case, that there could be no requirement in a petty offense case for a
lawyer judge.
Due Process in Criminal Cases in General
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that in most instance
the states are free to establish whatever procedures they feel are best
suited for the interests of its people in the disposition of criminal
cases.

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

The critical focus

in this case is not whether the due process clause of the Federal Constitution is applicable to state criminal cases since it is clear it is.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

Rather, this case raises the

question as to what degree of process must be followed.
Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:

See, Note,

Toward Limits on

the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1510 (1975).

Generally,

the United States Supreme Court has said that due process requires a
particular procedure when to deny the procedure would be a denial of
"fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice."
Kingsella v. United States, ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
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The Supreme Court of the United States has as yet never

imposed a

requirement that a magistrate have any particular level of training
or that he be admitted to the bar of the jurisdiction in which he is
sitting.

The case of Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972)

is in point in this regard.

There, the Supreme Court held that it was

within the bounds of due process for the City of Tampa to authorize
municipal court clerks who were neither lawyers or judges to issue
warrants, stating that the requirement of being neutral and detached
could be met by a layman.

The defendant in Shadwick argued that a lay

clerk was incapable of understanding and applying the principles embodied
in the Fourth Amendment.

To this, the court answered:

It is less than clear, however, as to who could
qualify as a 'judicial officer 1 under a p p e l l a n t s
theory. There is some suggestion in appellant's
brief that a judicial officer must be a lawyer
or the municipal court judge himself . . . But
it has never been held that only a lawyer or
judge could grant a warrant, regardless of the
court system or the type of warrant involved.
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-271
(1960), the Court implied that United States
Commissioners, many of whom were not lawyers or
judges, were nonetheless ' independent judicial
officers. ' J_d. at 347-48.
The court then went on to state that the test for the qualifications
of a magistrate in the present case was whether he was detached and
capable of determining probably cause and held that non-lawyer magistrate!
were capable of meeting the test.
Appellant likewise has failed to demonstrate that
these clerks lack capacity to determine probable
cause. Our legal system has long entrusted nonlawyers to evaluate more complex and significant
factual data than that in the case at hand . ] T
The significance and responsibility of these lay
judgments betray any belief that the Tampa clerks
could not determine probably cause for arrest.
What we . . . reject today is any per se invalidation
of a state
of local warrant system on the ground
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Communities may have sound reasons for delegating
the responsibility of issuing warrants to competent
personnel other than judges or lawyers. Id. at 352
(Emphasis a d d e d ) .
While Shadwick case decided only that non-lawyer, non-judicial
clerks were constitutionally capable of deciding probably cause, it is
relevant to the present case.

The issue presently before the court

is whether non-lawyer justices of the peace are per se unqualified

to

declare the law and determine the facts in application of the law
in limited misdemeanor situations.
such a blanket disqualification.

The Shadwick court would

reject

The court in Shadwick placed

stock in the fact that the non-lawyer clerks who were deciding

great
probable

cause had limited jurisdiction and were closely supervised by judicial
officers.

Similarly, under the Utah system, justices of the peace

benefit from required legal training, close higher court
and have only limited

supervision

jurisdiction.

Utah law requires close supervision and training of all
of the peace, thus assuring that the system comport with
fairness and due process.

justices

reasonable

Utah Code Annotated, § 78-5-27, passed in 1971

sets up a mandatory system of continuing education for justices of the
peace:
All justices of the peace shall attend one of
two annual institutes to be supervised by the
Utah Supreme Court. Any justice not attending
one institute during the year shall vacate his
office unless he has obtained a written excuse
for good cause from the chief justice of the
state Supreme Court.
In other cases involving the loss of individual

liberty, the

Supreme Court has not been willing to require the extension of a full
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panoply of constitutional rights.

In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471

(1972) the Supreme Court required certain due process standards be met
prior to the revocation of a prisoner's parole.

The court did not

require as a sin qua non to the revocation of parole that the accused
be afforded a lawyer.

A preliminary probable cause type hearing followed

by a more formal evidentiary hearing was all that was required.

The

court ruled with reference to the standard of professionalism of the
persons making the determination to revoke parole that they need not be
judges or lawyers.

The court observed, jjh at 489:

. . . (e) a 'neutral and detached 1 hearing body such
as a traditional parole board, members of which need
not be judicial officers or lawyers; . . .
Parole revocation may very well result in a longer period of incarceration
than that that could be imposed by a lay justice of the peace in the State
of Utah.

The Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to say that due proces

required a lawyer for the parolee or that the adjudicating body be made
up of judges or lawyers.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the court was faced
with a contention that in a revocation of probation that counsel should
be required at all hearings.

The court rejected such a rigid rule saying

that it "would impose direct costs and serious collateral disadvantages
without regard to the need or the likelihood in a particular case for a
constructive contribution by counsel."

The court ruled only that a

probationer was entitled to the preliminary and final revocation hearing
under the conditions specified in Morrissey.

The court's observation

is applicable to the issue raised in this case.
In Wolff v . M c D o n n e l l , 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the court was faced with
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the question as to what procedural rights a prisoner confined in an
institution was entitled to before being subjected to disciplinary

action.

The court concluded that the Morrissey and Scarpelli standards need not
be met even though a prisoner would face serious loss of liberty.
court recognized the difference between prison disciplinary
and court processes.

The

proceedings

A written statement of the charges and the hearing

were the primary benefits that the court felt the prisoner entitled to.
It denied the contention that a prisoner should be entitled to counsel
and further said, "We decline to rule that the adjustment committee which
conducts the required hearings at the Nebraska prison complex and
determines whether to revoke good time is not sufficiently impartial
satisfy due process."

to

The adjudication committee consisted of prison

officials with no indication that there was lawyer participation.

It is

submitted, therefore, that the Supreme Court's apparent unwillingness to
require lawyer trained personnel

in situations similar to those at issue

in this case does not make the requirement of a lawyer judge fundamental
to due process.

As was noted by the Arizona Supreme Court in Crouch v. Tl

Justice of the Peace Court of the Sixth Precinct, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 440
P.2d 1,000

(1968):

The fact that a Justice of the Peace is not an
attorney does not mean that he is per se unqualified to declare the law in the limited
type of situations over which he has jurisdiction.
The fact that a judicial error may be made in a
proceeding does not necessarily imply a denial
of due process of law. The 14th Amendment does
not assure immunity from judicial error.
See also, State v. Lynch, 197 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 697 (1971); State v.
Dziggel, 16 Ariz. App. 289, 492 P.2d 1227 (1972).

The Illinois Supreme

Court has also reached a similar result in City of Decatur v. Kushmer,
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43 111. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969).

Cases from other jurisdictions

have also reached the same general conclusion in a variety of contexts.
Mississippi County v. Green, 200 Ark. 204, 138 S.W. 2d 377 (1940);
State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914); State ex re!. Sellars v.
Parker, 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924); Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W. 2d 772
(Ky. 1973) appeal dismissed 414 U.S. 885 (1973); Attorney General ex rel.
Cook v. O'Neill, 280 Mich. 649, 274 N.W. 445 (1937); Spruill v. Bateman,
162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768 (1913); In re Hudson County, 106 N.J. 62, 144
Atl. 169 (1928); State ex rel. Swann v. Freshour, 219 Tenn. 482, 410 S.W.
2d 885 (1967.
Utah's Two Tier System Providing for Trial De Novo on Appeal

Adequately

Satisfies Due Process Standards
The Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, provides that appeal
are available from the final judgment of a justice of the peace in crimina
cases to the district courts on both questions of law and fact with such
limitations and restrictions as may be provided by law.

The legislature

has provided for a right of trial de novo in an appeal from a justice
court.

§ 77-57-43 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

A defendant may bypass the

justice court altogether by pleading guilty and obtaining a trial de novo
without prejudice before the district court.

Weaver v. Kimball, 59 Utah

72, 202 Pac. 9 (1921); i 77-57-38 Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
provides for a two-tier system.

Utah law

An accused who is tried before a justice

of the peace who is not a lawyer has an absolute right to have his case
heard anew before the district court where he would have a lawyer judge.
The United States Supreme Court has never required that a state" provide
the right to appeal to a defendant in a criminal case.

Griffin v. Illinoi

351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Therefore, UtahDigitized
goes
beyond
whatOCR,
current
federal constitutional
Machine-generated
may contain errors.

-16-

requirement of due process of law in providing an appellate process.
In addition, the appellate process meets the very complaint raised by
respondents in the instant case.

By extending the right to appeal to a

trial de novo the accused obtains a complete review of both the
adjudication and sentencing portions of his case and since this process
is extended to him as a matter of right, he has every opportunity to
have the due process respondent contends is constitutionally

mandated.

The Utah system is substantially different than that which was
before the California Supreme Court in Gordon v. The Justice Court,
12 Cal. 3d 326, 525 P.2d 72 (1974) where the California Supreme Court
held that the use of non-attorney justices to try misdemeanors where
there was a possibility of imprisonment was a violation of due process
of law.

Under California law, however, the accused does not have a right

to a trial de novo, but must appeal his case, Cal. Penal Code § 1466 (Wesi
1970).

It is a matter of discretion whether the defendant is granted

a trial de novo in California.

Cal. Penal Code i 1469 (West 1970).

Added to this problem in California is the fact that Justice Courts are
not courts of record (Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 1 ) , thus making the appeal
procedure more inadequate since any appeal would be based solely "upon
a statement of the case settled or prepared by the non-attorney judge
himself."

115 Cal. Rptr. at 638.

Thus, it is obvious that the Californi

system is not as protective of the accused's rights as is Utah's where
the defendant has an absolute right to a trial de novo.
considerations in determining the constitutional

The due process

validity of the

California system are different than in a jurisdiction where a trial
de novo is the defendant's

right.

In Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Supreme Court held that
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an accused was not entitled to counsel as a matter of due process on his
discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina where he
otherwise had counsel at the time of his first appeal.

The inverse

of that situation is present in the instant case, and the same conclusion
should hold true if a lawyer judge on appeal satisfies due process
requirements.

In other contexts, this would render moot the argument

being advanced by the respondents but for their efforts at obtaining
extraordinary relief.

Cf. Costarelli

v. Massachusetts, 43 L.W. 4510

(USSC 1975).
The two-tier system for adjudicating less serious criminal

cases

was held in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) to satisfy due
process, even though the judge in the de novo case could impose a
higher penalty.

The court acknowledged that many states do not

require justice court judges to be attorneys and that the mere fact
that a defendant had to endure a trial in an inferior court with less
adequate protections did not deny due process where trial de novo
was available.

The court

stated:

(M)any . . . systems . . . lack some of the
safeguards provided in more serious criminal
cases . . . Some, including Kentucky, do not
record proceedings and the judges may not be
trained for their positions either by experience
or schooling.

We are not persuaded, however, that the Kentucky
arrangement for dealing with the less serious
offenses disadvantages defendants any more or
any less than trials conducted in a court of
general jurisdiction in the first instance, as
long as the latter are always available.
407 U.S. at 113, 118.
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Proceedings in the inferior courts are simple and
speedy . . . Such proceedings offer a defendant
the opportunity to learn about the prosecution's
case and, if he chooses, he need not reveal his
own. He may also plead guilty without a trial and
promptly secure a de novo trial in a court of
general criminal jurisdiction. He cannot, and will
not, face the realistic threat of a prison sentence
in the inferior court without having the help of
counsel, whose advice will also be available in
determining whether to seek a new trial, with the
slate wiped clean, or to accept the penalty imposed
by the inferior court. The State has no such options,
Should it not prevail in the lower court, the case
is terminated, whereas the defendant has the choice
of beginning anew.
In reality his choices are to
accept the decision of the judge and the sentence
imposed in the inferior court or to reject what in
effect is no more than an offer in settlement of his
case and seek the judgment of judge or jury in the
superior court, with sentence to be determined by!
the full record made in that court. 407 U.S. at
119 (Emphasis added).
The trial court rejected the contention that the two-tier system
adequately affords due process.

(See, page 6 Memorandum Opinion).

The

trial court concluded that the respondents were entitled to a fair trial
in the first instance citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972)(1 11}is submitted that the analogy to the Ward case and its
predecessor, Toomey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), is inapplicable in the
instant situation.

In both cases, the Supreme Court held that where a

mayor before whom the defendant was tried on traffic offenses had a
substantial financial

interest in the outcome that trial before such an

individual was a denial of due process.

The court indicated that trial

was required before a disinterested or impartial judicial officer.

The

issue in the instant case in no way involves the question of whether
a judge has such an immediate interest in the outcome of the case as to
disqualify him.

A lay judge may be totally impartial where a lawyer

judge does not necessarily guarantee any greater degree of impartiality.
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-19I't cannot be said that per se a trial before a non-lawyer judge is the
equivalent of a trial before a judge that has a financial interest in
the outcome.

In both the Ward and Toomey cases although not mentioned

in the opinion, it would appear that trial was held before an executive
official who was not necessarily a lawyer and this was not a factor
in the court's opinions.
It is submitted that Utah's two-tier system effectively answers
the respondents' contentions that trial in the first instance before a
lay justice of the peace denies due process of law if imprisonment
may be imposed or is imposed.
Based on all the above considerations, it is submitted that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not require a lawyer judge where a sentence of incarcera
tion can or is in fact imposed.
POINT III
THE UTAH JUSTICE OF THE PEACE SYSTEM DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
A.

Proper Classification

The respondents in their complaint raised a contention that there
was a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States because persons tried for the same
offense before a city judge in Salt Lake County could receive a trial
before a lawyer whereas for the most part persons tried before a justice
of the peace in the same county would be tried by non-lawyers.

Respondent

therefore, claimed the appropriate classification to be that of Salt Lake
County for determining whether a denial of equal protection had occurred.
The trial court's decision does not appear to be predicated upon a denial
of equal protection.

However, the Memorandum Opinion is not altogether
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clear as to the exact basis upon which the trial court

relied.

Therefore, the equal protection issue should be considered by this
court.
It is submitted that in determining what is an appropriate
classification for applying equal protection standards that Salt Lake
County is not the proper classification standard.

In establishing

the

office of justice of the peace, the Utah Constitution purports to
operate statewide.

The legislative implementation of the constitutional

office of justice of the peace is not limited to Salt Lake County but is
applicable throughout the State of Utah.

Consequently, the appropriate

category for classification is the State of Utah not just Salt Lake
County.

When the classification

is examined on a statewide basis, it

appears that there is no merit to a claim of a denial of equal
B.

protection,

Rational Basis Standard

The United States Supreme Court has formulated two standards for
assessing whether a legislative classification violates the equal
protection standards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Supreme Court 1971 Forward:
Court:

See, Gunther, The

In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing

A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).

Where a category for legislative action is based upon political
racial criteria, it is a "suspect classification."
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

or

Harper v. Virginia

In those instances, there must

be ample evidence to justify the classification.

In other instances,

where such a classification basis is absent, the legislative

classificatic

will stand if there is any rational basis on which to justify the
differentiation.

Most recently, in Stanton v. Stanton, 95 S.Ct. 1373

(1975) the Supreme Court indicated that it need not determine whether a
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held that the matter could be decided on the more fundamental

rational

basis test.
In the area of criminal

law, the application of the equal

protection clause has been most readily identified with assuring

that

the benefits of a fair trial have been extended to defendants
irrespective of their wealth.

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

In the instant case, there is

no question concerning different treatment of individuals of varying
economic position.

The situation here is one of geographical

location

as to the place of the commission of the offense and the education of
the judge.

It is submitted that if any rational basis can be found

justifying lay justices of the peace that such classification can withstand constitutional

scrutiny.

A similar argument on equal

protection

grounds was raised in Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W. 2d 772 (Ky. 1973)
where the Kentucky Court of Appeals

observed:

There has been no showing in this case that non-lawyer
police judges, proportionately, convict more defendants,
impose higher sentences, or are reversed more on appeal,
than lawyer judges. There is no basis for any finding
that they are less fair and impartial in cases in which
the defendant, as he is entitled, is represented by
counsel, or that their ignorance of the law harms the
accused more than the government. There is no support
for the assertion that the non-lawyer judge, generally,
will accept the prosecutor's version of the law rather
than that of defense counsel.
We conclude that the bases for the classification
reasonably justify the classification in the balance
of the bases against possible detriment factors.
490 S.W. 2d 777.
It is submitted that when the State of Utah is considered as the unit of
classification that given its history, geography and demography that the
differentiation that the legislature has made is not only reasonable but
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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essential.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state

need only have some justifiable basis in enacting legislation
persons differently in order to sustain the legislation.

treating

Thus, the

court has ruled that there is no denial of equal protection because
students in one school district receive greater financial support than
students in another school district because of a different tax base.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

Thus, all

school districts are not required to provide the same educational
advantages.

Not all judicial forums need provide a judge of the same

degree of sophistication.
In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), the court held that
a New York statute denying certain state prisoners good time credit for
parole eligibility for the period of their pre-sentence

incarceration

and granting good time credit to those released on bail did not deny
equal protection since the state was able to articulate a rehabilitative
goal in such a differentiation.
In Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), the court said that a
rational justification was the standard to be applied in determining
whether Oregon law requiring an appellate filing fee for indigents seekin
to appeal adverse welfare decisions was unconstitutional.

The court

upheld the requirement in the face of an equal protection argument findin
that the categorization of requiring a fee for welfare appeals and not in
criminal cases involving loss of liberty and civil cases involving
termination of parental rights was not such an arbitrary classification
as to deny equal protection.
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In view of the fact that large segments of Utah must rely upon lay
judges as a part of the system of courts and do not have access to lawyers
allowing lay judges to serve as justices of the peace is not irrational.
City judges serve mostly in metropolitan areas and frequently in areas
where attorneys are most prevalent.

Justices of the peace often have

jurisdiction in remote areas and lawyers are often unavailable to act as
judges if they must reside in the precinct.

Hence, it cannot be said

that the failure to require justices of the peace to be lawyers is
irrational.
Salt Lake County
Even assuming that the respondents 1 equal protection unit of
classification of Salt Lake County is the proper classification

for

considering whether the current justice of the peace system violates
equal protection, it is submitted that the rational basis test would
still be satisfied.

In Salzberg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954), the

United States Supreme Court upheld legislation in the State of Maryland
that treated certain defendants in criminal cases differently in one
county over another as against a claim of denial of equal

protection.

The court found the justification based on the different problems within
the particular county.

Most recently, in In re Trader, 16 Cr.L.Rep. 2072

(Md. Ct. of App. 1974), the Maryland Court, referring to the Salzberg
case, upheld different treatment of juveniles within the same county
finding that the circumstances within the county justified the differenti
ation.

In the instant case, there is no evidence to show why a classifi-

cation requiring city judges in Salt Lake City to be lawyers and allowing
justices of the peace in Salt Lake County encompassing a more rural area
is not a legitimate classification.

Since the burden is on the
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a presumption that the classification is constitutional, it is submitted
that respondents did not establish their contention of a violation of
equal protection of the laws.
POINT IV
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
IS NOT VIOLATED BY ALLOWING A DEFENDANT IN A MISDEMEANOR
CRIMINAL CASE TO BE TRIED AND SENTENCED TO A TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT BY A NON-LAWYER JUDGE.
The trial court concluded that if an accused was entitled to legal
counsel in a misdemeanor case where there was a possibility of imprisonment, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), that due process
likewise mandated a lawyer judge to "comprehend and utilize counsel's
legal arguments. 11

The trial court then concluded that only a lawyer

judge could impose a sentence of imprisonment.

The California Supreme

Court in Gordon v. The Justice Court, supra, ruled that permitting nonlawyer judges to preside over a criminal trial in which the offense is
punishable by jail sentence violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The California court concluded that a fair trial

was not otherwise possible.

The due process argument has heretofore been

treated and the only question is whether the Sixth Amendment requires a
lawyer judge in order to make the right to counsel effective.
It is submitted that there is no constitutional requirement for a
lawyer judge in cases where imprisonment is imposed or may be imposed as
a matter of effectuating the Sixth Amendment.

The Sixth Amendment to

the Constitution flatly states that the accused shall enjoy the right Htc
have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

At the time of the

adoption of the Sixth Amendment, lay judges were quite common.

Counsel

could provide an accused with guidance through the labryinth of legal
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accused's defense.

The position that seemed to be taken by the trial

court in the instant case is that only a lawyer can understand a lawyer.
If such is the case, the legal profession instead of becoming more adept
in the articulation of a client's cause would appear to have become
so mute that only a narrow class of persons can comprehend what is being
said.

Such simply is not the case.

A lawyer can still be an effective

advocate for his client before a non-lawyer judge.

He can marshall the

facts in a way to make them more comprehendable to the trier of fact.
The lawyer performs this function when the case is submitted to a lay j u n
He can articulate the legal principles involved to a lay judge in the sam<
fashion that he often must articulate such principles when presenting the
case for decision to a lay jury.

He can still raise in an intelligent

and persuasive fashion all that reasonable advocacy would expect.
Essentially, the assistance of counsel is for "the right to be heard."
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

The same reasons that compel

the right to counsel do not necessarily mandate a lawyer trained judge.
Laymen in many contexts are required to apply and appreciate legal
principles.

Income tax, commercial law, corporate law are all areas

where laymen often effectively handle legal matters.

In the field of

criminal law, laymen most frequently apply the law, these being
policemen, charged with interpreting the law as well as making a
determination as to whether the process of government should be directed
against a person's activities.

The logical extension of the contention

that the Sixth Amendment is not meaningful unless there is a lawyer
listening to counsel's presentation would require lawyer juries and
maybe lawyer officials in the pre-judicial enforcement of the criminal
law.

Such an extension would be impossible to meet and most unnecessary.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-26-

In

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court

adopted a standard for required procedures in juvenile cases similar
in some respects to that later required in misdemeanor cases in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra.

Thus, the court required that a juvenile

have the right to counsel where the child may be subjected to the loss
of his liberty.

In the same opinion, however, the court noted that in

the juvenile justice system as it existed at the time of Gault according
to the National Crime Report "indicates that half of these judges have
no undergraduate degree, a fifth have no college education at all, a
fifth are not members of the bar, and three-quarters devote less than
one-fourth of their time to juvenile matters."

It also noted that the

George Washington University Center for Behavioral
a detailed statistical

Sciences of 1965 did

study of juvenile court judges and found that

"about a quarter of these judges have no law school training at all."
Even with those observations, the court did not impose any requirement
that a juvenile be brought before a judge who is a member of the bar
or who has any particular standard of training.

The court laid out

numerous rights that a juvenile may have including the right to counsel
but apparently at the time of Gault the court believed the right to
counsel to be sufficient to protect a juvenile accused without
requiring that the judge be a member of the bar.

additional

It is submitted

therefoi

that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer judge and that the
analogy adopted by the trial court and by the California Supreme Court to
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, is not one that is mandated by the Federal
Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court in the instant
case erred in concluding that an accused has a constitutional right to
a lawyer judge before a sentence to imprisonment can be imposed.

An

examination of the due process, equal protection and right to counsel
arguments reveals that the Constitution of the United States does not
require that an accused be tried by a lawyer judge before a sentence of
imprisonment can be imposed.

Nothing in the Constitution of the United

States says anything about the qualifications of the federal judiciary.
It has been suggested from time to time that a non-lawyer should be
appointed to the Supreme Court.

In some jurisdictions, the juries

actually fix the sentence of imprisonment.

To mandate the requirement

of lawyer judges would not only distort the historical meaning of the
Constitution of the United States but would'place an immense burden
on the present judicial system.

The impact of upholding the trial

couft's decision would be difficult to calculate.

This court should

reverse the trial court and conclude that lawyer judges are not required
before a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed or a case adjudicated
where imprisonment may be a possibility.
Respectfully submitted,
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